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ABSTRACT
The academic community has proposed many solutions to
address the privacy concerns associated with genomic-data
sharing. However, practitioners have not adopted these so-
lutions due to their impact on the data utility. To ad-
dress this problem, we introduce GenoShare, a framework
that helps practitioners to make informed decisions about
the sharing of exact genomic data by providing means to
systematically reason about the risk of disclosing privacy-
sensitive attributes (e.g., health status, kinship, physical
traits). We instantiate GenoShare with three of the most
important genomics-oriented inference attacks, and demon-
strate its capability to detect potential leakage of sensitive
attributes using real data from the 1000 Genomes Project.
1. INTRODUCTION
The privacy risks stemming from disclosing medical ge-
nomic data [13, 17, 40] are being increasingly amplified by
the growing number of breaches occurring in healthcare or-
ganizations [53, 44, 21, 56]. This situation creates a com-
plicated environment for health care practitioners and re-
searchers trying to engage with citizens regarding the shar-
ing of data for clinical research, as gaining their trust is
becoming a major challenge. Currently, medical institu-
tions and research centers address this problem by relying
on a review board that decides whether disclosure is suit-
able. However, these decisions usually follow all-or-nothing
policies, which provide little control on the inferences that
can be made upon the shared data. Thus, they are of lit-
tle help at conveying trust to users. The computer security
community has made a remarkable effort to improve this sit-
uation, mainly focusing on solutions that perturb the data
such that releases are differentially private [15, 28, 62], since
anonymization approaches [51, 35, 33, 61] have been shown
futile for privacy-preserving sharing of genomic data [18, 22].
Despite the demanding privacy needs of genomic data
management, these solutions have not been adopted by prac-
titioners so far. A main reason for this reluctance is that
genomics applications usually require genomic data to be as
exact as possible [13, 16, 41]. High accuracy is especially
important in association studies aiming to identify signifi-
cant correlations between particular genotypes and rare dis-
eases, which are often weak signals. Moreover, differentially
private solutions focus on safeguarding only the release of
aggregates, and thus are not suitable for protecting individ-
ual’s data, whose sharing is a common practice in research
studies. In summary, the need to release the exact data
values precludes the use of state-of-the-art solutions that
provide formal privacy guarantees in the presence of arbi-
trary external information.
Yet, genomic data sharing is crucial to advance the state
of the art in medicine. Thus, there is a high demand in
the biomedical community for solutions that enable prac-
titioners to reason about what exact data can be released
while protecting individuals’ privacy in clinical and research
settings. Even though they cannot prevent inferences en-
abled by unforeseeable attack developments or data releases,
such solutions would represent a great improvement over the
current situation since they can effectively reduce the pri-
vacy risks based on the information available to the decision
maker.
In this paper, we introduce GenoShare, whose goal is to
assist practitioners in decision making by quantifying the
risk of sensitive information leakage when sharing genomic
data. Let us assume that an institution (e.g., hospital, re-
search center) wishes to share genomic data, but is con-
cerned about the privacy of the individuals who contributed
their data. Upon reception of a request for genomic data
sharing, such institution can use GenoShare to quantify the
risk of sensitive attribute disclosure associated to revealing
those data. To this end, GenoShare considers inference at-
tacks relevant to the privacy concerns of the data contrib-
utors, and the information available to the adversary: i)
the genomic statistics across populations [52], ii) the ge-
nomic association to sensitive information [20, 50], and iii)
the correlations between genomic variants inside an individ-
ual’s genome, and across related individuals’ genomes. As
opposed to prior works that consider only one type of in-
ference attack at a time [22, 25, 46], GenoShare quantifies
the risk of a privacy breach considering the joint effect of in-
ference attacks, i.e., exploiting their interrelations, and can
also consider partial adversarial knowledge – thus provid-
ing a more realistic risk estimation than the state-of-the-art
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approaches.
If the risk of sensitive attribute disclosure is deemed low,
the institution can release the requested data in exact form,
and otherwise it denies access to the data. GenoShare
measures risk using novel intuitive metrics that, as opposed
to current approaches based on inferences of raw genomic
values [58], are directly related to the inference of tangi-
ble information, such as kinship or predisposition to a dis-
ease. Thus, they are well suited for modeling informed con-
sent [31]. Furthermore, since denying access based on in-
formation secret to the adversary is known to leak informa-
tion [29], GenoShare implements mechanisms to avoid this
leakage.
To summarize, we make the following contributions:
X We present GenoShare, a framework that supports in-
formed decision making regarding the sharing of exact ge-
nomic data by considering relevant inference attacks, and
their joint effect on privacy.
X We introduce novel metrics that capture the risk of sen-
sitive attributes disclosure, better suited to model informed
consent than the state of the art.
XWe develop a novel method for preventing inferences based
on genomic query denials. The idea is to internally use ava-
tars (modified versions of individual’s genomes) to decide
upon data release, still releasing the original data when pri-
vacy is not at risk.
X We instantiate GenoShare with the three most relevant
attacks on genomic privacy, advancing the state of the art by
adapting them to consider partial information and consid-
ering their interrelations to amplify their inference power.
We show GenoShare’s effectiveness at detecting potential
private information leaks using real data from the 1,000
Genomes Project [52].
2. GENOMICS 101
Genetic Variation. The human genome consists of three
billion pairs of nucleotides with values in the set {A, T,C,G}.
Around 99.5% of the whole human genome is identical for
any two individuals, and the remaining part is referred to
as genetic variation. Out of the many existing types of ge-
netic variations, we focus on the most common, which stems
from differences in single nucleotides, called single nucleotide
variants (SNVs). In the human population, a given genetic
locus (defined as a position in a chromosome) can have sev-
eral possible versions (or alleles). Each individual either has
two copies of the same allele (homozygous) or two copies of
different alleles (heterozygous). Genetic variants in a given
individual genome are identified by comparing the genome
with the reference human genome, a digital sequence of
nucleotides considered representative of the human genetic
makeup. In the vast majority of cases, a genetic variant is
biallelic, i.e., it can take two different alleles: a reference al-
lele, the one appearing on the reference human genome, and
an alternate allele, the alternative version occurring in the
human population. The latter presence is quantified by the
alternate allele frequency, or aaf. Hence, a genetic variant, at
a given position, can be homozygous reference (i.e., taking
two reference alleles), heterozygous (one reference and one
alternate alleles) or homozygous alternate (two alternate al-
leles). We encode the value (or genotype) of a variant gi at
position i as gi ∈ {0, 1, 2}, based on the number of alternate
alleles it contains.
Genotype-Phenotype Association. Genomic variants
can be associated to phenotypes, e.g., diseases or physical
traits, either increasing the predisposition of an individual to
develop a disease at some point in time, or being protective
with respect to that disease. The strength of this associ-
ation is generally quantified by the effect size, denoted as
ω = log(OR), where OR is the odds ratio. The odds repre-
sent the ratio between the probability of disease occurrence
in a given group and the probability of non-occurence in the
same group. The odds ratio is the odds in the group of indi-
viduals carrying a genetic variant divided by the odds in the
group of those not carrying it. If there are Ndg individuals
carrying a disease and a variant, Nhg healthy individuals
carrying the same variant, Ndn individuals carrying the dis-
ease but not the variant, and Nhn healthy individuals not
carrying the variant, then the OR is Ndg/Nhg
Ndn/Nhn
.
Genetic Correlations. Because genetic segments (or hap-
lotypes) are inherited in blocks, physically close variants are
very often correlated. Such a correlation is called linkage dis-
equilibrium (LD). Beyond intra-genome correlations, there
exist inter-genome correlations that stem from reproduction.
During the reproduction process, at each genetic position,
a child inherits one allele from his mother and one from his
father. Under the Mendelian inheritance assumption, each
allele of a parent is passed to the child with equal proba-
bility 0.5, independently of the other positions. Moreover,
given both parents’ genomes, a child’s genome is condition-
ally independent of all other ancestors’ genomes.
3. THE GENOMIC SHARING SCENARIO
We consider a scenario in which an institution holds a
database D with genomic data of lots of individuals. We
model an individual’s genome inD as a vector g = (g1, . . . , gn)
formed by n variants on autosomal chromosomes (i.e., not
sex chromosomes), where gi denotes the value of variant i.
We use a vector f = (f1, . . . , fn) to model aggregated statis-
tics on these variants. We summarize the notation used
throughout the paper in Table 2 (Appendix D).
Institutions wish to share these data in one of two ways:
i) as a subset of genotypes gs, in response to a genotype re-
quest for variants of a given individual, qg(gs); and ii) as a
subset of aggregated statistics fs for a specific group of in-
dividuals, in response to an aggregated request for variants,
qm(fs). Because genomic-related applications are not toler-
ant to noisy data, institutions want to share them in their
original, exact, form.
On the other hand, individuals whose genomes are in D
could be concerned about the potential disclosure of their
sensitive information. They express such concerns establish-
ing a threshold, ρ, that captures their tolerance to disclosure
of sensitive information with respect to the risk of inference.
We assume an adversary who wants to learn some (sen-
sitive) information about individuals in the database pro-
tected by GenoShare. Genome-based inference attacks can
be categorized as follows: (i) Phenotype inference attacks,
that aim at inferring an individual’s predisposition to dis-
eases (e.g., Alzheimer’s disease, cancer, schizophrenia) [13],
or her physical traits, from her genotype and known genotype-
phenotype correlations [20]; (ii) Membership inference at-
tacks, whose goal is to infer the presence of an individual
of whom genomic information is available in a group for
which aggregate statistics are known [22, 48], which can be
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very sensitive if such a group is associated with a sensitive
attribute (e.g., HIV-positive patients, patients in a psychi-
atric institute, etc.); (iii) Kinship inference attacks, that aim
at inferring familial relationships between know individuals’
genomes; (iv) Re-identification attacks, that aim at infer-
ring the identity (e.g., family name) [18] behind a known
genome, or physical traits (e.g., height, eye color, etc.) that
can lead to re-identification [9]; or (v) Linking attacks, that
aim at linking anonymized sensitive phenotype data avail-
able to the adversary to a set of individuals for which their
genotypes are known by exploiting genotype-phenotype cor-
relations [26, 19].
To perform inferences, the adversary could have access to
the following information :
–Background information (B) such as public information
about average individuals’ genomes [52], and about genomic
association to sensitive information [50, 20]; or information
made public by individuals, e.g., on OpenSNP [42] that pro-
vides access to further genomic data, or on Facebook [14]
that provides information about familial relationships [25],
–Revealed variants of the targeted individual and of her rel-
atives (Ag), and aggregated statistics (Am),
–Potentially revealed variants: information that would be
revealed if a new request is granted (gs or fs), or that could
be inferred in case of GenoShare denying a high-risk query.
4. GENOSHARE
We design GenoShare to help institutions owning a database
of genomic sequences to share exact genotypes (gs) or ag-
gregated statistics (fs) in a privacy-conscious way. When
GenoShare receives a data request (either qg(gs) or qm(fs)),
it quantifies the privacy risks regarding inferences stemming
from the release of the data. If the risks are deemed too high
with respect to given thresholds ρ, GenoShare prevents any
automatic release of data. It can further provide the insti-
tution with information that can be used to make a privacy-
conscious decision regarding whether to share the requested
data.
We note that when queries are granted, GenoShare cannot
protect the information that has already been released from
inferences that could be made possible by advances in the
state of the art in genomics research. This limitation is
inherent to the practitioners’ need for clean and exact data.
4.1 Architecture
GenoShare is conceptually divided in four main blocks,
illustrated in Figure 1:
Attack Engine. This engine simulates the inference at-
tacks that the adversary can perform given both the infor-
mation already available to him (Ag, Am, and B), and what
would be disclosed if the query was granted (gs or fs).
Risk Measurement Engine. This engine computes the
risk of sensitive attribute disclosure materializing if the data
requested in the query is revealed.
Decision Engine. This engine checks if the risk computed
by the Risk Measurement Engine exceeds the established
thresholds for any individual in the database.
Avatar Engine. The Avatar Engine creates and stores ava-
tars: modified versions of the stored genomic data. Avatars
are used, internally, in the Attack Engine to simulate the
inference attacks, and in the Risk Measurement Engine to
quantify the inference risk. Their goal is to mitigate poten-
tial inferences on the true genome based on query denials.
Note that, whenever the decision is to grant the queried
data, the true data is released.
4.2 Using GenoShare
Initialization. GenoShare requires an initialization phase
in which the attacks to be considered are instantiated in the
Attack Engine (Sect. 5); the privacy metrics are set up in
the Risk Measurement Engine (Sect. 6); the corresponding
risk thresholds ρ are set up in the Decision Engine; and
the Avatar Engine generates one avatar per individual per
attack considered in the Attack Engine (Sect. 7).
Operation. Upon reception of a data request (qg(gs), or
qm(fs)), two steps are needed to run GenoShare:
1. Configuration. GenoShare needs to be configured to
decide: (i) what background information B is assumed to
be available to the adversary (e.g., only data released by
tool, familial relationships, genome data obtained from other
sources,. . . ); and (ii) which attacks are of a concern for the
given request.
2. Execution. To evaluate the query, GenoShare substitutes
the requested data (gs or fs) by the corresponding avatar
genotypes (g˜s or f˜s). Then, it runs all the attacks configured
in the Attack Engine, whose output is then input to the Risk
Measurement Engine. This engine computes the risk of a
privacy breach, and the Decision Engine verifies whether it
complies with all individuals’ thresholds. If any of the risks
exceeds the corresponding thresholds, GenoShare prevents
the release of the data. If not, it releases the exact data
requested in the query (gs or fs).
5. GENOSHARE’S ATTACK ENGINE
The Attack Engine runs all the inference attacks config-
ured in GenoShare , to mimic the actions that an adversary
would perform to learn sensitive information about individ-
uals. As opposed to prior works that consider inference
attacks independently, GenoShare considers them jointly,
thus maximizing their effect. We now introduce the three
most well-known attacks, namely phenotype, membership,
and kinship inference, that we instantiate with state-of-the-
art inference techniques. We note that GenoShare can ac-
commodate other attacks, such as the re-identification at-
tack, the linking attack or others, and it can be updated
with better techniques each time there is a new proposal.
5.1 Phenotype inference attack
Phenotype inference attacks are aimed at learning genotype-
related sensitive phenotypes about a target individual (and
her relatives), such as predisposition to diseases or physical
traits. For simplicity, in this paper we only consider predis-
position to diseases inference.
Phenotype inference attacks run in two steps: (i) genotype
completion, in which the adversary uses the target’s known
variants, i.e., those that he has already observed, to infer
correlated unobserved variants both from the target and her
relatives, and (ii) genotype-phenotype mapping, in which,
given the recovered variants, the adversary computes the
target’s disease predisposition using publicly available in-
formation about genotype-phenotype correlations. We now
provide details about these two phases that are relevant to
understand the avatar generation algorithms in Sect. 7.
Genotype completion. Genotype completion enables the
inference of unobserved variants gu from the variants avail-
able to the adversary (i.e., previously revealed and to be
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sFigure 1: The four main blocks in GenoShare: i) an Avatar Engine that generates and stores avatar genomes which are
used internally to avoid inferences based on query denials; ii) an Attack Engine that simulates the adversary’s behavior in
order to predict what information could be learned if the requested data are released; iii) a Risk Measurement Engine that
quantifies the risk of disclosing sensitive information when releasing data; and iv) a Decision Engine that verifies whether
the privacy risks are under the thresholds ρ, and either outputs the exact requested data (gs or fs) or nothing. The
figure shows instantiations of the blocks for three inference attacks, and the bottom row illustrates how other attacks could
be accommodated.
revealed, go := Ag ∪ gs, and background information B),
and the genotype data in a public panel of reference indi-
viduals R. It outputs a posterior probability distribution
for each unobserved variant, gˆ = Pr(gu|go,B,R). We in-
stantiate this inference using a well-established statistical
technique called genotype imputation [37] that makes use
of a Hidden Markov Model (HMM) to model the target’s
genome. Simpler techniques could be used but, to the best
of our knowledge, genotype imputation provides the most
accurate genotype inference [46].
Then, the adversary can infer the variants of the target’s
relatives from the completed genotype, i.e., the exact ob-
served genotypes go and the probabilistically inferred ones
gˆ, and the knowledge on target’s family tree. We model
the target’s family as a Bayesian network and the well-
established junction tree algorithm [32] can be used to com-
pute, for each family member, the set of marginal probabil-
ity distributions over the unobserved variants conditioned
on the target’s information previously inferred (go ∪ gˆ).
The details of both genome imputation and the junction
tree algorithm are explained in Appendix A.
Genotype-phenotype mapping. An individual’s genetic
predisposition to a disease can be inferred from her genotype
at variants associated with the disease, and the strength
of this genotype-phenotype association. As explained in
Section 2, this strength is characterized by the effect size
ωy = log(OR), where OR is the odds ratio. More formally,
let Ψ(y) be the set of variants associated with disease y.
Then, the adversary computes the target’s predisposition to
disease y, denoted as P y, as the linear combination of the
target’s inferred genotypes gˆi of variants i in Ψ(y) weighted
by the strength of the genotype-phenotype association ωi.
5.2 Membership inference attack
The membership inference attack enables the adversary
to infer whether a target individual, for which variants are
known, is present in a group of individuals for which ge-
netic aggregated statistics are available [22, 59, 47, 57, 27,
64, 48]. We instantiate this attack using the technique pro-
posed by Homer et al. [22] because it relies on less restrictive
assumptions than other approaches, but any other member-
ship inference technique could be used instead. This tech-
nique compares, for every target’s observed variants go, (i)
the distance between the alternate allele frequency gi
2
in the
target’s genotype and aafi (the alternate allele frequency in
the population) with (ii) the distance between gi
2
and fi,
the frequency of the same allele in the group of interest.
Formally, using the L1 distance:
D
(gi
2
)
=
∥∥∥aafi − gi
2
∥∥∥− ∥∥∥fi − gi
2
∥∥∥ . (1)
When the target is in the group, E
[
D( gi
2
)
]
is greater than
zero because gi
2
shifts fi away from aafi. On the contrary,
under the null hypothesis (the target is not present in the
group of interest) E
[
D( gi
2
)
]
should approach zero. If gi
2
is
further away from the group than from the reference popula-
tion, i.e., even less likely to be part of the group, E
[
D( gi
2
)
]
is negative.
If the number of released frequencies is sufficiently high,
E
[
D( gi
2
)
]
converges to the normal distribution due to the
central limit theorem. This enables the adversary to make
use of a one-sample t-test to determine whether the target
is part of the group or not. As we explain in Section 5.4,
the adversary can make use of the output of the genotype
completion (gˆ) to further improve the membership attack.
As the output of genotype completion is a probability dis-
tribution over the possible values of a variant, we adapt (1)
such that it incorporates this knowledge. For k ∈ {0, 1, 2}:
D
(
gˆi
2
)
=
∥∥∥∥∥aafi −∑
k
k
2
Pr(gˆi = k)
∥∥∥∥∥−
∥∥∥∥∥fi −∑
k
k
2
Pr(gˆi = k)
∥∥∥∥∥ .
(2)
5.3 Kinship inference attack
The kinship inference attack enables the adversary to in-
fer the degree of kinship of a pair of target individuals, given
a common set of their variants. We instantiate this attack,
for the first time, with a technique that estimates the pro-
portion of genomic variants co-inherited from a common
ancestor [36, 54]. Similarly to the previous attacks, other
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Figure 2: Interrelation among inference techniques
techniques could be used. In particular, we use the kinship
coefficient φA,B proposed in [36], defined as the probability
that two alleles sampled at random from two individuals A
and B are identical by descent. We compute φA,B as the
average over all variants’ coefficients φˆi,A,B computed as:
φˆi,A,B =
2aafi(1− aafi)− (gi,A − gi,B)2
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∑
i∈MA,B aafi(1− aafi)
, (3)
where MA,B is the set of observed variants for both individ-
uals. If the number of observed variants is sufficiently high,
the sum of φˆi,A,B over all variants converges to the nor-
mal distribution due to the central limit theorem. Similarly
to the previous attack, the adversary can infer the degree
of kinship of the target individuals by using the inference
criteria in [36] (see Table 1 in Appendix B). As there are
different kinship levels, in our experiments we use a closed
testing procedure [38] of consecutive one-sample t-tests and
choose the closest relationship that can be inferred.
5.4 Attacks interrelations
In order to best estimate the adversary’s inference capa-
bilities, the Attack Engine takes into account interrelations
between the different attacks which can benefit from each
other as shown in Figure 2. The genotype completion car-
ried out within the phenotype inference attack can be used
to improve the efficacy of the membership inference attack,
because it increases the knowledge of the adversary about
the target’s genotype information: A larger number of the
target’s variants is made available to establish her member-
ship to the database. On the contrary, the kinship inference
attack cannot benefit from genotype completion. This is
because genotype completion relies on correlations between
variants, but the accuracy of the estimated kinship coeffi-
cient relies on independent variants. However, the kinship
inference attack can improve the phenotype inference at-
tack by informing about the familial ties which enable us to
build the Bayesian network model. As a consequence, the
kinship inference attack indirectly and positively influences
the membership inference attack. Finally, the membership
inference attack can also enhance the genotype completion
of the phenotype inference attack if it reveals that the target
is present in a database associated with a phenotype that is
correlated to a particular genotype. We do not evaluate the
latter in Section 8, as understanding the information gained
by the adversary is straightforward.
6. GENOSHARE’S RISK MEASUREMENT
ENGINE
GenoShare needs to have means to measure the risk of
sensitive attribute disclosure when granting a request qg(gs)
or qm(fs). Such risk needs to be understood by a large
variety of users with extremely diverse knowledge related
to genomics and/or medicine (e.g., patients, doctors, re-
searchers). As such, we propose metrics to represent sen-
sitive attributes that could be understood by the public at
large [31]. It must be noted, however, that the Risk Mea-
surement Engine could be instantiated with any other met-
rics deemed suitable for measuring the information leaked
to the adversary in order to characterize other more-or-less-
specialized concerns. For instance, metrics oriented to avoid
bulk disclosure of data, e.g., by including a large percentage
of variants in the risk computation, or metrics of interest for
experts, such as genomic researchers, in which only specific
variants are considered to be risky.
6.1 Phenotype inference risk
The phenotype inference risk aims at capturing how well
the adversary can infer a target’s phenotype, e.g., a physical
trait or a predisposition P y to a disease, regardless of the
actual phenotype value, i.e., her inference error. For sim-
plicity we focus our explanation on disease predisposition,
but note that the metric can be easily adapted to other phe-
notype inferences.
Disease predisposition can be inferred through the pheno-
type inference attack, see Section 5.1. If the adversary had
access to all the target’s actual genotypes, he could perfectly
compute her predisposition. However, when GenoShare is in
place, the adversary only has access to the previously dis-
closed genotypes (Ag), and to those that he can infer using
the genotype completion (gˆ). Recall from Section 5.1 that,
for each gˆi, the adversary obtains a probability distribution
over the three possible variant values {0, 1, 2}. Given the
known and inferred variants, the predisposition P y can be
estimated using the genotype-phenotype mapping.
Wagner defined the per-variant success rate of the adver-
sary as the probability that the adversary correctly infers the
true variant value given the genotype inference output [58].
Inspired by this metric, we quantify the risk of inferring a
given disease predisposition, denoted as Ry, by weighing the
per-variant privacy metric by the per-variant strength of as-
sociation ωi between genotype and disease predisposition:
Ry =
1∑
i ωi
∑
i
ωi Pr(gˆi = gi), i ∈ Ψ(y), (4)
where Ψ(y) is the set of variants associated with disease y
and gi the individual’s true genotype of variants i in Ψ(y).
6.2 Membership and kinship inference risks
We consider membership and kinship inferences to be bi-
nary classification problems. These are based on a one-
sample t-test used to test the null hypothesis of the individ-
ual not being in the dataset, in the case of membership (see
Sect. 5.2), or not being related to anyone else in the database
in the case of kinship (see Sect. 5.3). Thus, to quantify these
inference risks, we use α, the significance level of the clas-
sification (i.e., the false positive rate), and 1 − β, the test
statistical power, where β denotes the false negative rate.
Intuitively, the higher the power and the lower the signifi-
cance level are, the more certain the adversary is about his
classification. Therefore, an individual’s privacy grows with
α and β (i.e., when the number of false positives, resp. false
negatives, grows).
We define the risk of membership inference as
Rm = (1− βm, αm) , (5)
and the risk of inferring kinship of degree d as
Rkd = (1− βd, αd), d ∈ N∗ . (6)
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7. GENOSHARE’S AVATAR ENGINE
Denying access to private data can leak information about
these data, because decisions are based on information not
available to the attacker [29]. Simulatable auditing [30] pre-
vents such leakage by anticipating incoming queries, and
only replying to those that do not enable unauthorized in-
ferences. Unfortunately, existing solutions in this direction
are limited to statistical queries different from aggregated
requests in the genomic scenario, and not applicable to the
case of individual genotype requests.
The key intuition in simulatable auditing is that, to pre-
vent leakage, a decision to deny a query must be based exclu-
sively on the information released by the system (including
the potential answer to the current query), but not on the
query itself nor other value in the database. Building on
this idea, one may be tempted to use existing techniques
to produce synthetic data [5], or perturb the data to make
it differentially private [2], in order to obtain alternative
data with similar statistical properties to those of the orig-
inal data. These alternative data can be used as input for
the decision process so that the query denial does not de-
pend on the original sensitive data. However, by following
this approach, GenoShare can take incautious decisions in
particular instances, i.e., granting a query deemed safe for
the alternative input, while for the original genomic data
it would have raised an alarm. Such a risky behavior is
not acceptable for medical institutions notably because of
patients’ privacy.
To mitigate this problem, we propose to use avatars, new
modified versions of an individual’s genome or a database’s
aggregates used internally by GenoShare. Avatars, as op-
posed to perturbed or synthetic data, always guarantee con-
servative decisions when used in GenoShare’s decision pro-
cess. They are used as input to the Attack and Risk Mea-
surement Engines instead of the original genomes, thus en-
suring that, given a denial, the adversary can, at most, re-
cover the avatar. We note that when a query is granted,
i.e., deemed safe, always the original data is released, not
the avatars.
We define two types of avatars: genome avatars (g˜), and
aggregates avatars (f˜) to substitute genotypes (gs) and ag-
gregates (fs) real inputs, and construct them to ensure that
decisions are never incautious. In terms of the risk metrics
defined in Section 6, this implies that phenotype inference
attacks on the avatar should result in a success rate, Ry,
larger than on the real genome; and membership (resp. kin-
ship) inference attacks should result in higher power, 1−βm
(resp. 1− βd) for a given significance level αm (resp. αd).
Avatar-based privacy. Guaranteeing safety of the deci-
sions with respect to the real genomes inevitably leads us to
generating avatars that are not fully independent from the
real genomic data they represent. Thus, we cannot provide
the provable protection guaranteed by simulatable audit-
ing. Instead, we quantify the level of privacy provided by
GenoShare’s avatars. Let us consider genotype requests as
an example. Given a query denial, the probability of the
adversary inferring one true genotype is:
Pr[gi|g˜i] · Pr[g˜i|denial] , (7)
where g˜i denotes the value of gi’s avatar, Pr[gi|g˜i] denotes
the probability that the adversary succeeds at recovering
true genotypes from the avatar, and Pr[g˜i|denial] denotes
the probability of learning the avatar from the denial. The
latter strongly depends on the concrete sequence of queries
and their replies, hence cannot be computed analytically.
Thus, we choose to assume the worst-case scenario in which
the adversary does recover the avatar and concentrates on
computing the first probability, Pr[gi|g˜i]. This worst-case
scenario provides a lower bound on the privacy provided by
avatars. If the adversary cannot correctly recover the avatar
from the denial (i.e., Pr[g˜i|denial] < 1), the overall privacy
increases.
Then, for a given individual, we compute her avatar’s pri-
vacy as the average error of the adversary over all variants:
Privg˜ =
1
n
∑
i
(1− Pr[gi|g˜i]) , Privf˜ =
1
n
∑
i
(1− Pr[fi|f˜i]) .
(8)
We note that, depending on the use case, it could make sense
to only consider variants that are deemed most sensitive for
the individual.
In the following, we propose avatar-generation algorithms
for the three families of techniques we instantiate in the
Attack Engine. We note that the proposed avatar generation
methods are not tied to any particular implementation of the
attacks, but based on their fundamental operation principle.
Thus, they are valid for any attack inside a family.
7.1 Genome avatar
Genome avatars g˜ are used as input to the Attack Engine
when GenoShare receives a genomic request qg(gs). Since
the inference techniques are based on different principles,
avatars must be technique-dependent to guarantee that, for
all cases, GenoShare outputs a conservative decision.
Phenotype inference. GenoShare quantifies the pheno-
type inference risk stemming from a phenotype inference
attack using Ry (as in (4)), dependent on the adversary’s
error. Hence, to trigger conservative decisions avatars need
to reduce this error with respect to the case where the real
genome would be used for the attacks. Phenotype inference
attacks rely on genome completion to infer unknown variants
before using a phenotype-genotype mapping to perform the
inference (see Sect. 5.1). The working principle of genotype
completion techniques is to infer unobserved variants using
common patterns in a reference panel R. This implies that
inferred variants are likely to be equal to the most common
variants in R. Thus, setting the avatar to such common
variants increases the probability that the inferred variants
are equal to the avatar (Pr(gˆi = g˜i)), reducing the error in
Ry.
Let us denote as g˙i the most common value in the ref-
erence panel for variant i. Depending on the variant’s aaf,
we have that g˙i = 0, if aaf ≤ 0.5, and g˙i = 2 otherwise
(variant’s values encoded as 1 are never the most common,
since they are split in two depending on which of the two
chromosomes holds which allele). We compute the genome
avatar for phenotype inference, denoted as g˜g, using a pri-
vacy configuration parameter pg ∈ [0, 1]:
g˜gi =

g˙i, if gi = g˙i,
g˙i, if gi 6= g˙i, with probability pg,
gi, if gi 6= g˙i, with probability 1− pg.
(9)
Given this creation mechanism, we compute the proba-
bility that the adversary succeeds at recovering true geno-
types from the avatar considering the two possible avatar
values. When g˜gi 6= g˙i, the adversary is certain that the
6
value observed is the real genotype gi (third case in (9)),
thus succeeds with probability one. On the other hand,
when g˜gi = g˙i, the choice that maximizes the adversary’s
success is to guess that gi = g˙i. Her success probability
is 1 − pg(1 − Pr[g˙i]), where the second term captures the
probability of failure, i.e., g˜gi = g˙i was a consequence of the
second case in (9). Therefore, the privacy level computed as
in (8) is:
Privg˜g = 1−
∑
i 1g˜gi 6=g˙i + 1g˜
g
i =g˙i
(1− pg(1− Pr[g˙i]))
n
,
(10)
Effectively, the parameter pg balances the privacy and de-
cision precision provided by the avatar. The larger pg is,
the larger the difference between avatar and real genome is
(more privacy), but the more different are the decisions with
respect to the real genome.
We note that, when related individuals are in the same
system, their avatars must be consistent with the Mendelian
inheritance laws to avoid inconsistencies when the junction
tree algorithm is used for genotype inference of relatives.
Given the two parents’ avatars generated using the method
in (9), we construct offspring avatars by “virtually mating”
the parents’ avatars. To ensure conservativeness, we choose
the most conservative combination that is consistent with
the parents for the offspring, instead of choosing at ran-
dom as happens in reality. Given this creation mechanism,
the offspring’s avatar is independent from the real offspring
genome, and thus does not leak information. It is only
related to the parents’ avatars which provide the privacy
stated in (10).
Membership inference. The membership inference risk
is measured in GenoShare as the power of a test establishing
whether a statistical summary (e.g., allele frequencies) of a
target individual’s genome is more similar to the dataset of
interest or to the reference population (see Sect. 5.2). There-
fore, in order to trigger conservative decisions, an avatar
should be more similar to the dataset than the real individ-
ual’s genotypes.
To build the avatar, we first check which allele contributes
more to the dataset aggregate for each variant. Then, with
probability pm, we replace the target’s real value with such
allele. Formally, we compute the genome avatar for member-
ship inference, denoted as g˜m as follows. For each variant i
that is in the dataset, given a privacy parameter pm ∈ [0, 1]:
g˜mi =

max(0, gi − 1), with probability pm, if aafi ≥ fi
min(gi + 1, 2), with probability pm, if fi > aafi
gi, with probability 1− pm.
(11)
The parameter pm can be used to trade-off privacy and
decision precision. Following the same reasoning as for the
genome avatar, the success probability of the adversary is 1
when aafi ≥ fi and g˜mi = 2, and when aafi < fi and g˜mi = 0.
In the former case, she knows that gi = 2, in the latter
gi = 0 (third case in (11)). Otherwise, the success of the
adversary is max(pm, 1− pm), depending on the probability
of replacement. Then, the term Pr[gi|g˜mi ] in (8) is:
Pr[gi|g˜mi ] =

1, if aafi ≥ fi ∧ g˜mi = 2
∨aafi < fi ∧ g˜mi = 0
max(pm, 1− pm), otherwise .
(12)
Kinship inference. Similar to membership inference, the
risk of kinship inference depends on the power of a test mea-
suring how similar the genomes of two individuals are (see
Sect. 5.3). Essentially, the degree of relationship inferred
by this test depends on the amount of overlap weighted by
the allele frequency of the sampled variants. Hence, to en-
sure conservativeness, avatars should be more similar to the
target’s relative genome that the target itself.
For an individual A, we compute the genome avatar for
kinship inference with respect to individual B, denoted as
g˜k, given a privacy parameter pk ∈ [0, 1] as:
g˜ki =

gi,B , if gi = gi,B ,
gi,B , if gi 6= gi,B , with probability pk,
gi, if gi 6= gi,B , with probability 1− pk,
(13)
where gi,B is B’s genotype at variant i.
Since this avatar generation process is analogous to the
one for genotype inference, privacy is computed in the same
way:
Privg˜k = 1−
∑
i 1g˜i 6=gi,B + 1g˜i=gi,B (1− pk(1− Pr[gi,B ]))
n
,
(14)
where Pr[gi,B ] is genotype gi,B ’s prior probability in the
population.
Each individual in the database needs to have one genome
avatar for kinship inference per relative in the database.
When simulating the kinship inference attack, the Attack
Engine uses the avatar that corresponds to the closest rel-
ative known to the adversary (e.g., because of previous re-
leases).
7.2 Aggregates avatar
Aggregates avatars f˜ are used when GenoShare receives
an aggregates’ request qm(fs). As only the membership in-
ference technique makes use of the dataset, one aggregated
avatar is sufficient.
Intuitively, conservative decisions for membership-inference
attacks should be triggered when the aggregates avatar is
more similar to the genomic information to be tested by the
adversary than to the population, so individuals would be
found to be in the database and GenoShare would prevent
the sharing. We construct the aggregates avatar for mem-
bership inference, denoted as f˜ , as follows. Given privacy
parameters γ, pf ∈ [0, 1], for all i for which fi 6= gi/2, we
sample δf˜ii from U [0, γ|fi−gi/2|], and generate f˜i as follows:
f˜i =

fi − δf˜ii if fi > gi/2 with probability pf
fi + δ
f˜i
i if fi < gi/2 with probability pf
fi with probability(1− pf ) .
(15)
If fi = gi/2, there is no way to construct a conservative
avatar, and the avatar value will take the original value fi.
Therefore, the adversary’s success probability is 1 in this
(very rare) case. In other cases, the adversary will infer the
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frequency that maximizes his success between the original
fi (third case in (15)) and the modified ones (first or second
cases in (15)) depending on the parameters. The resulting
privacy of this avatar is given as:
Privf˜ = (16)
1− 1
n
∑
i
1fi=gi/2 + 1fi 6=gi/2 max
(
1− pf , pf 
γ|fi − gi/2|
)
,
where the second term in the maximum function is derived
from the following. As we rely on the uniform (continuous)
distribution to generate f˜i, the probability of being exactly
at fi is, in general, not defined. Instead, we compute the
probability of being in a small interval (represented by )
around fi, knowing f˜i:
Pr[|Fi − fi| ≤ |f˜i] =

1, if f˜i = fi,

∆
, if (fi > gi/2 ∧ fi −∆ ≤ f˜i < fi)
∨(fi < gi/2 ∧ fi < f˜i ≤ fi + ∆),
0, otherwise,
(17)
where ∆ = γ|fi−gi/2|. In this case, pf can be used to trade
off privacy and accuracy in a coarse manner, and the param-
eter γ serves to fine-tune this trade-off. Note that, for the
aggregate avatar, contrary to the genome avatar, the privacy
value never depends on the specific avatar value f˜i, mainly
because we deal here with continuous values and not three
possible discrete values that significantly constrain the space
of possible avatars (in conjunction with the requirement to
output a conservative query answer).
7.3 Using avatars
The avatar generation mechanisms described above de-
pend on configuration parameters px, x ∈ {g,m, k, d}, that
define the level of privacy provided by the avatars Privg˜,
resp. Privf˜ . As obtaining a closed expression that expresses
the relation between the level of privacy and px is extremely
complex, deriving analytically configuration values is not
possible. However, computing avatars is extremely cheap.
Thus, one can efficiently search for adequate parameters
(e.g., using the bisection method).
Every time GenoShare is launched, it uses as many avatars
as attacks its needs to consider. However, we note that an
adversary cannot learn more than a single avatar for a given
position by making multiple requests. Indeed, either there
is no denial and the adversary learns nothing about any
avatar, or there is a denial and this denial will always be
based on the same avatar (the most conservative one) for
later requests. In other words, there cannot be a denial
based on more than one avatar.
8. USINGGENOSHAREWITHREALDATA
We now show how GenoShare can, in practice, support
privacy-conscious decisions when sharing genomic data. We
consider three use cases in which the adversary makes differ-
ent requests and has different background knowledge. These
use cases are chosen to illustrate how GenoShare reacts to
the most likely combinations of requests and background
knowledge, and how the interrelations between the attacks
influence GenoShare’s decision.
8.1 Experimental Setup
Real Data. We run our experiments on the genomes of
351 individuals with ad mixed American ancestries (AMR)
from the 1,000 Genomes Project [52]. For each individual,
we sample 270k variants across all autosomal chromosomes,
and take this to be a representative sample of her genome.
We use 250 individuals to build the public reference panel
(R), and the remaining 101 to simulate the institution’s
database (D). We also build a “sensitive” dataset formed
by 50 random individuals in D to simulate an HIV-related
cohort H (any other sensitive disease could be alternatively
used here as an example).
GenoShare’s Initialization. We set up GenoShare’s At-
tack Engine with the three inference attacks introduced in
Section 5. To instantiate the phenotype inference attack, we
implemented genotype completion using Brian L. Brown-
ing’s BEAGLE implementation v4 [7, 6], and the junction
tree algorithm using the Netica Bayesian network Software [11].
We take the disease-variant associations for the AMR popu-
lation from the GWAS Catalog [20] for genotype-phenotype
mapping. To instantiate membership and kinship inference
attacks, we used our own implementations of the Homer [22]
and kinship coefficient [36] inference techniques.
GenoShare’s Avatar Engine is set up using the generation
techniques in Section 7. For all individuals inD, we generate
(i) a genome avatar for phenotype inference, (ii) a genome
and an aggregates avatar for membership inference, if they
are also part of H; and (iii) a genome avatar for kinship
inference, if they have relatives. Finally, the Risk Measure-
ment Engine is initialized with the risk metrics in Section 6,
and we instantiate the Decision Engine with risk thresholds
particular to each use case.
8.2 Use Cases
In the following, we assume that the adversary always re-
quests data about a single target individual, or summary
statistics about a single disease-related cohort. To consider
multiple individuals/cohorts, it suffices to replicate the ex-
periments for all targets.
UC1: Genotype request – no background knowledge
on D.
In this scenario, the institution receives consecutive requests
for releasing batches of 100 variants of individual A in D.
We consider that A is part of the HIV-related cohort,H, and
one of her relatives, B, is also in D but not in H. A’s risk
thresholds for phenotype inference risk, membership to the
HIV-related cohort inference risk, and kinship inference risk
are ρy = 0.9, ρm = 0.7, ρk = 0.9, respectively. We consider
that the adversary’s background knowledge (B) consists of
the publicly available reference panel R.
Upon reception of a genotype request qg(gs), the institu-
tion configures GenoShare with B and ρ above, and launches
it. Then, all the attacks in the Attack Engine are run on
A’s genome avatars, considering all their interdependencies.
Let us first consider the phenotype inference attack. To
illustrate the evolution of A’s phenotype inference risk, we
consider the adversary’s goal is to learn her predisposition
to Alzheimer’s disease and bipolar disorder. We stress, how-
ever, that GenoShare could be configured to consider disclo-
sure of any other genomic-related clinical trait or phenotype.
Figure 3 shows this risk’s evolution as consecutive batches
of variants are released. The solid line represents the risk
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Figure 3: UC1 – Disease predisposition inference risk, Ry,
when releasing A’s genotypes in batches of 100: effect of re-
leasing arbitrary variants on the risk of inferring predisposi-
tion to Alzheimer’s disease (A1) and bipolar disorder (A2);
effect of releasing schizophrenia-related variants on the risk
of inferring predisposition to Alzheimer’s disease (B1), and
bipolar disorder (B2).
for A’s real genotype, and dashed lines for A’s avatars of-
fering privacy Privg˜g = {0.05, 0.1, 0.2} (maximum privacy is
Privmaxg˜g = 0.29). The dotted red line represents A’s thresh-
old ρy = 0.9. The first point in each figure represents the
risk before any variant is released, i.e., the prior risk for
A computed as in (4) where the adversary’s estimation of
the target variants’ is made according to the alternate allele
frequency in the population aafs.
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Figure 4: UC1 – Power of membership inference for different
levels of adversarial knowledge (αm = 10−4).
We consider two data-request patterns. The first pattern
consists of a series of requests for arbitrary variants, that are
not necessarily correlated with any sensitive disease. This
case represents the behavior of a researcher looking for new
genomic associations with a disease of interest at a genome-
wide scale. The results of this experiment are shown in
Figure 3(A1-2). First, we observe that released data become
part of the adversary’s knowledge as Ag, and thus the risk
never decreases. Second, as expected, releasing arbitrary
(thus likely disease-unrelated) variants slightly affects A’s
predisposition inference risk for both considered diseases,
when computed on the real genotypes. Yet, when avatars
are used, as they contain more common variants, this growth
is larger. This is because, due to the genotype completion
technique that favors the estimation of common values in
R, the estimation of the avatar is better.
The second pattern consists of a series of requests for vari-
ants correlated with a specific disease, concretely schizophre-
nia. This represents a typical scenario in which a researcher
studies variants of known significance. Results in Figure 3(B1-
2) show that releasing these variants does not have a par-
ticular impact on the risk of inferring A’s predisposition to
Alzheimer’s disease as these two diseases are genetically un-
correlated [8]. Yet, because of the high genetic correlation
between bipolar disorder and schizophrenia, the risk of infer-
ring predisposition to bipolar disorder significantly increases
as more schizophrenia-related variants are released.
Regarding GenoShare’s decision, the larger is Privg˜g the
more conservative are the decisions based on the correspond-
ing genome avatars, i.e., for a given inference risk level they
allow to disclose less data than those based on the true
genome. For instance, let us consider the risk of inferring
predisposition to bipolar disorder (Fig. 3(B2)). Given A’s
threshold, ρy, if computations were done on the real genome,
GenoShare would allow to release up to 300 genotypes (inter-
section of the black line and the red dotted line), risking an
information leak when the decision is to deny a query. This
risk can be mitigated by using avatars, at the cost of re-
leasing less data. The most protective avatar (Privg˜g = 0.2,
cyan) enables the release of around 200 variants, while the
less protective one (Privg˜g = 0.05, blue) permits the release
of almost as many variants as with the real genome (black).
Given space constraints, in the following, we only show
results for the consecutive releases of arbitrary variants. We
obtained similar results for variants related to schizophrenia.
Releasing A’s variants not only affects her phenotype in-
ference risk but also her membership and kinship inference
risks. We show the effect on the risk of inferring her mem-
bership to the HIV-related cohort H for a false positive rate
αm = 10
−4 in Figure 4. In the different rows of Figure 4,
we consider that the adversary has obtained an increasing
number of aggregates from previous queries (Am) to be in-
corporated to his background knowledge B. Unsurprisingly,
the more genotypes are revealed, the stronger is the inference
power, up to the point where the number of genotypes and
aggregate statistics released are the same (vertical dotted
line). Then the inference power remains constant because
there are no more aggregate statistics to gain information
from (horizontal dotted line). We observe that genotype
completion helps membership inference by increasing the in-
ference power before the vertical dotted line. Indeed, thanks
to genotype intra-correlations, a larger number of genotypes
than those made available to the adversary can be used in
the attack (see Fig. 10 in Appendix C(A) for comparison
with the membership inference power without the contribu-
tion of genotype completion). The behavior of the avatars
(dashed lines) is similar to the previous case, privacy can
9
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1
−
β
d
Number of already known variants for individual A:100
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1
−
β
d
Number of already known variants for individual A:500
0 2 4 6 8 10
Released batches of 100 variants gs for individual B
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1
−
β
d
Number of already known variants for individual A:1000
d= 1
Privk = 0. 05
Privk = 0. 1
d= 2
Privk = 0. 05
Privk = 0. 1
d= 3
Privk = 0. 05
Privk = 0. 1
ρk = 0. 9
(A) First-degree relationship between A and B
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1
−
β
d
Number of already known variants for individual A:100
d= 2
Privk = 0. 05
Privk = 0. 1
d= 3
Privk = 0. 05
Privk = 0. 1
ρk = 0. 9
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1
−
β
d
Number of already known variants for individual A:500
0 2 4 6 8 10
Released batches of 100 variants gs for individual B
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1
−
β
d
Number of already known variants for individual A:1000
(B) Second degree relationship between A and B
Figure 5: UC1 – Power of kinship inference for different
degrees (αd = 10−4).
be enhanced at the cost of releasing less information. We
note that, the more variants are released, the less different
is the avatar from the actual genotype. Hence, the inference
power based on the avatar and real genome converges.
Finally, Fig. 5 shows the effect of genotype release on risk
of inferring A and B’s kinship for different degrees of re-
latedness d = {1, 2, 3} and a false-positive rate αd = 10−4.
Similarly to the previous case, each row assumes that the
adversary has an increasing number of variants from B as
part of his knowledge Ag. We consider two cases where
A and B are first and second degree relatives. In the first
case (Fig. 5(A)), we see that the kinship inference power
is already maximized when 300 variants are disclosed for
both individuals. Because of the closed test procedure, the
power for d > 1 is also maximized. However, the kinship
inference power for d = 0 (monozygotic twins) is negligible
regardless of the number of variants used in the attack, as
there is no possibility that this is the case. In the second
case (Fig. 5(B)), few variants suffice to infer with significant
power that the individuals are at least third degree relatives
(d = 3). Yet, 1,000 variants are not enough to determine
their real kinship, d = 2, with high certainty. In fact, up
to 4,000 variants are necessary to maximize this inference
power (see Fig. 11 in Appendix C). Again avatars perform
as expected, enabling a trade-off between amount of released
data and privacy in case of query denials.
We recall that GenoShare denies a query as soon as any
of the inference risks breaches its corresponding threshold.
For instance, if we consider an avatar with Privg˜g = 0.05,
and adversarial background knowledge of 500 aggregates
from H and 500 genotypes from B (second degree relative),
GenoShare prevents the release of data at the fourth request
because of the kinship inference risk being too high.
UC2: Genotype request – kinship background knowl-
edge.
In this scenario, the institution holding D receives consecu-
tive requests for releasing genotypes of arbitrary pathogenic
variants (i.e., related to a disease) of individual A. A, and
also her parents B and C, are part of the HIV-cohort H.
Their degree of kinship is already known by the adversary
and it is part of his background knowledge B. For example,
he could have inferred this information through the kinship
inference attack when A’s, B’s and C’s genotypes were re-
leased by GenoShare , or if their kinship information was
publicly available on Facebook [25]. Moreover, we assume
that A, B, and C have different privacy concerns: A is not
worried about any potential privacy breach and sets very
permissive thresholds ρA = {ρy = ρm = 0.95}, whereas B
and C have more restrictive preferences ρB = {ρy = ρm =
0.7} and ρC = {ρy = ρm = 0.8} (Note that, as kinship is
known, we disregard the kinship threshold.)
Upon reception of a genotype request qg(gs), the insti-
tution configures GenoShare with B, ρA, ρB and ρC , and
launches it. GenoShare runs both phenotype and member-
ship inference considering their interrelation, and computes
the risk of a privacy breach for the three individuals. Fig-
ure 6(A) illustrates the evolution of A’s, B’s, and C’s pre-
disposition to type 2 diabetes inference risk. Because of the
kinship effect, releasing A’s genotypes has an effect on B’s
and C’s risk computed with both the real genotype (solid)
and avatars (dashed). We note that, because the three in-
dividuals are involved, it is enough that at least one of their
risk thresholds is exceeded to deny the request. For instance,
if avatars are used, even though the first query would be
deemed safe for A (blue), it would be denied because it im-
plies that the risk for B (yellow) goes above her threshold.
Because it improves genotype completion, kinship infor-
mation also significantly affects membership inference. Fig-
ure 6(B) illustrates the evolution of the risk of membership
to the HIV-related cohort H inference for A, B, and C for
αm = 10
−4 when 1,000 aggregates are already known to the
adversary. Similarly to the previous use case, we observe
how releasing A’s genotypes also increases the membership
inference risk for B and C. Also, observe that, as in the third
row of Figure 4, genotype completion helps the adversary by
significantly increasing his inference power (even if only 100
genotypes are available after the first query, the adversary
can exploit the 1000 aggregates that are available).
UC3: Aggregate request – no background knowl-
edge on D.
In this last scenario, the institution holding D receives con-
secutive requests for releasing aggregate statistics fs of the
HIV-related cohortH. We consider the same privacy prefer-
ences and background knowledge as in UC1. Upon reception
of a request for aggregate data, the institution configures
GenoShare with public background knowledge and launches
it. In this particular case, GenoShare only runs the member-
ship inference attack because it is the only attack for which
obtaining new aggregates helps the adversary.
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Figure 6: UC2 – Disease predisposition and membership
inference risk for A, B, and C
Figure 7 shows the effect of a series of aggregate data
releases on the risk of inferring A’s membership to the HIV-
related cohort H, for a false-positive rate αm = 10−4 and
different amount of A’s variants available to the adversary.
Unsurprisingly, the more aggregates are released, the higher
the inference power. It is important to note that, thanks to
the genotype completion carried out in the phenotype infer-
ence, the adversary can use every new released aggregated
frequencies even if the corresponding genotypes of A have
not yet been revealed (i.e., after the black dotted lines cross).
Thus, the risk of membership inference keeps growing with
every extra frequency observed by the adversary. Without
the contribution of the genotype completion, inference power
stays constant since additional aggregate statistics cannot
be used by the membership attack (see Figure 10(B) in Ap-
pendix C). As in previous cases, we observe how avatars
enable to trade off privacy for amount of data released.
Finally, this use case also shows GenoShare’s utility in the
case where the adversarial background knowledge consists of
the full genome of some individuals in H. For example, in-
dividuals that put their genome online (e.g., on OpenSNP),
or have been sequenced at a direct-to-customer genomic ser-
vice (e.g., 23andMe) that keeps a copy of their genome. In
these circumstances, as the genome is already known, the
only attack that GenoShare can mitigate is the membership
inference attack based on aggregate data requests. We em-
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Figure 7: UC3 – Effect of releasing batches of 100 aggregates
on the risk of membership inference (αm = 10−4, γ = 0.25).
phasize that, for GenoShare to not underestimate the mem-
bership inference risk in such a case, it is the responsibility
of the individuals to communicate to the institution holding
their genomic data that other copies are available elsewhere.
In this case, GenoShare’s background knowledge should be
set to account for the adversary’s knowledge of the complete
target’s genome before its execution.
8.3 GenoShare’s Performance
GenoShare is not intended to be a real time tool, but to
be run oﬄine. We conduct performance measurements on
an 8-core Intel Xeon CPU E3-1270 V2 processor 3.50GHz,
and 32 GB of memory, running Debian Linux. We measure
the time required for computing the inference risks for the
three considered attacks by executing GenoShare 10 times
on 10 different requests of 100 arbitrary variants, and re-
port the average over the 100 experiments. Although the
considered inference techniques are naturally parallelizable,
our measurements are made on a single thread of execution
and thus represent an upper bound for computation time.
We find that, despite its apparent complexity, the use of
GenoShare entails very reasonable overhead. As expected,
since they only require fast arithmetic operations, the com-
putation time of both the kinship and membership inference
attacks is within the second hence negligible, and grows lin-
early with the number of variants to be tested. Similarly,
the generation of avatars, which is performed only once dur-
ing GenoShare’s initialization, is also negligible. On the
other hand, the phenotype inference attack, that uses BEA-
GLE’s Java implementation for genotype completion, takes
on average around 8 minutes and 14 seconds at each new
request. We note that this timing is strongly influenced by
our choice of running BEAGLE with default parameters and
limiting the amount of memory allocated for the Java vir-
tual machine to 2GB, and could be reduced by optimizing
the configuration (e.g., with a typical 22-node cluster it re-
quires less than 23 seconds). We also note that the genotype
completion computation time depends both on the number
of variants to be considered across the genome (in our case
270k variants), and on the number of individuals in the ref-
erence panel R (in our case 250 individuals). We refer the
reader to the original publication for more details on how
BEAGLE scales [7, 6].
In terms of storage, for each individual in the database,
GenoShare requires one avatar per kind of attack instanti-
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ated. The size of an avatar is at most the size of the set of
human genetic variations, i.e., roughly 1% of a full genome.
Thus, GenoShare’s storage requirements are certainly prac-
tical.
9. RELATEDWORK
We revise attacks and defense mechanisms for genomic
privacy which are most relevant to our work. We refer the
reader to existing surveys [13, 40] for an exhaustive review
of the state of the art.
Attacks. A first group of relevant attacks, referred to as
attribute disclosure, can be subdivided into two categories.
The first category, attribute disclosure via genomic com-
pletion, includes all techniques that rely on the intra- and
inter-genome correlations to infer unobserved variants [34] to
reduce genomic privacy of individuals [46] and relatives [24].
In this work, we improve previous inference techniques by
taking both familial correlations and intra-genome correla-
tions using genotype completion. The second category, at-
tribute disclosure via membership inference, exploits knowl-
edge of summary statistics of a given dataset to infer that a
known genome is part of it [10, 22, 27, 47, 57, 59, 64]. As
such datasets are typically associated to a disease of inter-
est, inferring membership unveils very sensitive attributes.
Commonly exploited statistics are allele frequency and geno-
type counts, or statistics about linkage disequilibrium. In
this work, we explore for the first time the effectiveness of
these attacks in presence of incomplete information, and the
benefits of genotype completion on membership inference.
A second group of relevant papers deals with kinship infer-
ence. Previous works show how to exploit inter-genome cor-
relations to infer familial relationships based on the amount
of genomic data shared by individuals in genome-wide as-
sociation studies with distinct subpopulations [36] or in ad-
mixed populations [54]. Recently, Arthur et al. have pro-
posed a toolkit for analyzing large cohorts of whole-genome
sequenced samples that includes kinship inference relying on
state-of-the-art methods [1]. Our contribution is the framing
of kinship inference as from a privacy perspective, both as
an attack to reveal familial relationship and as complement
to genotype completion to increase the amount of genetic
information that can be inferred about an individual.
Finally, we revise re-identification attacks that de-anony-
mize genomic data by relying on auxiliary knowledge. Gym-
rek et al. have proposed an attack of this kind [18], which
uses short tandem repeats on the Y chromosome (Y-STRs)
to map anonymous genomes to those available in a recre-
ational genetic genealogy database online to recover the sur-
name of their (male) owner. Similarly, Humbert et al. link
de-identified genotypes to online profiles, such as those from
online social networks, by relying on genomic variants that
influence phenotypic traits [26]. In this paper, we do not
consider these attacks for space constraints and because they
highly rely on the access to external background knowledge
that may be difficult to access (e.g., the Y-STR database
used by Gymrek et al. has been put oﬄine after this attack
was made public). Yet, we note that GenoShare’s Attack
Engine can easily accommodate re-identification attacks by
integrating it in the different engines.
Protection mechanisms. In addition to de-identification,
which is a necessary but not sufficient protection method as
shown above, there exist two approaches for genomic pri-
vacy protection. The main idea behind the first approach is
to properly apply noise, e.g., achieving differential privacy,
on summary statistics for protecting a study participants’
privacy and thus thwarting attribute disclosure attacks [28,
49, 55, 63]. Fredrikson et al. show that, however, using
differential privacy in pharmacogenetics can lead to an un-
acceptable loss of utility, e.g., exposure of patients to an
increased risk of stroke, bleeding events, and mortality [16].
Also, practitioners require exact genomic data to avoid false
genotype-phenotype associations. Bhaskar et al. propose
a noiseless version of differential privacy but their solution
makes some statistical assumptions on the data that are too
restrictive for the genomics setting [4]. Our solution does not
perturb the released aggregated data at all, regardless of the
data distribution. Moreover, the aforementioned protection
mechanisms are not suitable for the release of an individual’s
variants. The second approach relies on secure storage and
processing [3, 12, 23, 40, 60, 39] which are complementary
to our proposed solution. In fact, secure processing protects
only the data while processing, but GenoShare considers all
the disclosed/shared information, including also the results
of a computation.
10. CONCLUSION
Academic solutions for privacy-preserving sharing of ge-
nomic data have mostly focused on data perturbation. Such
solutions, however, damage the utility of the data and thus
have not been accepted by practitioners. In this work, we
introduce GenoShare, a framework that supports privacy-
informed decision-making when sharing genomic data. Geno-
Share quantifies the risk of sensitive attribute disclosure, and
prevents the automatic sharing of data if the risk is deemed
too high with respect to privacy thresholds encoded using
novel meaningful sensitive attribute-oriented metrics. Oth-
erwise, it releases exact data as requested by genomics re-
search practitioners. Furthermore, GenoShare implements
avatar genomes to protect individuals’ real genotypes from
inferences stemming from query denials.
To the best of our knowledge, GenoShare is the first frame-
work to jointly consider relevant attacks in genomic privacy
in presence of incomplete information. It provides a princi-
pled answer to the privacy concerns that have plagued the
genomic community for the last decade, and thus it is a
firm step forward to enable the responsible and privacy-
respecting use of genomic data in research and medical en-
vironments. We hope that it will dramatically improve the
current situation in institutions, thereby accelerating the
slow and costly processes carried out by committees and
lawyers by serving as support for more informed decisions.
Although we have focused on the protection of genomic
data, the systematic principles underlying GenoShare make
it suitable to deal with other data types where correlation
with sensitive information can be detrimental for an individ-
ual’s privacy, e.g., other ’omics’ data such as transcriptomic.
Furthermore, GenoShare can also be used to understand the
risk incurred when voluntarily disclosing information to find
others who have a similar rare disease and share experiences
as on PatientsLikeMe [43] or to safely enjoy recreational ge-
nomics or direct-to-consumer genomics services.
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APPENDIX
A. GENOTYPE IMPUTATION
Inference for target’s unobserved variants. As ex-
plained in Section 5.1, in order to infer genotypes of unob-
served variants for the target individual given the genotypes
of some observed variants and the genotypes of individuals
in a public reference panel, we use a well-established statisti-
cal technique called genotype imputation [37]. In particular,
we compute the posterior probabilities Pr(gu|go, R), where
gu is the set of unobserved variants, go := Ag ∪ gs ∪ B is
the set of observed variants within the same genome, and
R is the genotype information for the reference individuals
whose set of observed variants is g := gu ∪ go.
At a high level, genotype imputation works by using pat-
terns of blocks of highly correlated variants, so-called haplo-
types, in the reference panel to predict unobserved variants
when only a subset go of g has been observed. By definition,
a haplotype is a set of variants on a chromosome that tend to
always occur together, i.e., that are statistically correlated.
This process is illustratged in Figure 8.
Let us call “reference haplotypes” the set of haplotypes in
the panel of a reference individual, and “target haplotypes”
the set of observed haplotypes in the target genome. A
target genome can be considered as a mosaic of reference
haplotypes. If a reference haplotype is similar to the target
genotype in the region of a given target haplotype, then
such a reference haplotype can be chosen to be the one in
the mosaic at that target observed haplotype position.
Now, more formally, let HR be the set of reference hap-
lotypes in the panel of reference individuals, and let HT be
the set of the target’s observed haplotypes, in chromosome
order. Then, the target’s genome can be modeled as a Hid-
den Markov Model (HMM) where the state space is the set
of all ordered pairs (hT , hR) whose first element hT ∈ HT
is a target’s observed haplotype and whose second element
hR ∈ HR is a reference haplotype [34]. When modeling a
target genotype, a state (hT , hR) has high probability if the
target genotype is well represented by a mosaic of reference
haplotypes. Let us denote the set of model states at hap-
lotype hT ∈ HT as HhT = {(hT , hR) : hR ∈ HR}. Then,
we can use the HMM forward-backward algorithm [45] to
estimate the probabilities Pr(ShT = h), ShT ∈ HhT condi-
tional on the HMM model and the values of the observed
variants on the target haplotype. Li and Stephens model [34]
is the state-of-the-art model for summarizing and interpret-
ing genetic intra-correlations, i.e., Linkage Disequilibrium
(LD) among multiple variants by considering all loci simul-
taneously, rather than pairwise. We refer the reader to the
original paper for further details.
Inference for relatives’ unobserved variants. We make
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Figure 8: High-level representation of the genotype imputa-
tion technique.
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Figure 9: High-level representation of the junction tree al-
gorithm: From a family tree (0), a Bayesian network is con-
structed (1) and then moralized through triangulation in
order to obtain a moralized graph (2). Finally, The mor-
alized graph is transformed into a clique tree (or junction
tree) (3) by guaranteeing that for each pair of cliques U, V
with intersection S, all cliques on path between U and V
contain S.
use of a well-established inference algorithm, the junction
tree (or clique tree) algorithm [32] to infer the hidden vari-
ants in the relatives’ genomes from the observed variants
go and variants imputed in the target individual gˆ. As
propagation of the evidence has already been carried out
throughout the genome with genotype imputation (horizon-
tal inference), The genotype inference for unobserved vari-
ants of target’s relatives focuses on familial correlations (i.e.,
across relatives). Thus, without loss of generality, we focus
our description on a single variant.
Because probabilistic inference induces the computation
of marginal posterior probabilities, its computational com-
plexity increases exponentially in the number of considered
variables, i.e., relatives’ variants, if the marginalization is
carried out directly on the global joint distribution between
these variables. As already mentioned in 5.1, the idea be-
hind the junction tree algorithm and its core inference algo-
rithm, belief propagation, is to split the global joint proba-
bility distribution that represents the genomic variants of r
relatives at a given variant v into smaller distributions that
keep only dependent variants (variables) together.
In our context, thanks to the Mendelian inheritance laws,
we can split the global joint distribution into smaller prob-
ability functions, as follows:
Pr(gv,1, gv,2, . . . , gv,r) =( ∏
j∈founders
Pr(gv,j)
)( ∏
k/∈founders
Pr(gv,k|gv,m(k), gv,f(k))
)
,
(18)
in order to use allele probability distributions, where founders
is the set of individuals who have no parents (with observed
genotype data) in the family tree of interest, and m(k) and
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f(k) are the mother and father of k. As shown in Figure 9,
from this factorization, we can construct a Bayesian net-
work whose nodes represent the variants of the r relatives
of interest and whose (directed) edges represent direct de-
pendencies between them. In this Bayesian network, each
child node (i.e., not founder) have two parent nodes, as in
the real (biological) life, and it is defined by a conditional
probability table (representing Pr(gv,k|gv,m(k), gv,f(k))) that
is given by the Mendelian inheritance probabilities.
The only issue that could lead to approximate inference is
the fact that siblings in a real family generate (undirected)
loops in the underlying Bayesian network. The junction
tree algorithm removes these loops by clustering each child
node with their two parent nodes when the two parents have
more than one offspring, as shown in Fig.9. Then, the belief
propagation algorithm computes the marginal probabilities
of each clique separately, and propagates its computation
to other cliques in the tree. Due to the tree structure of
the underlying graph, the inference algorithm converges in
only two iterations, one forward and one backward, and is
linear in the number of relatives r, and in the number of
variants |V | (since the inference at each variant can be run
independently from another). Note that the algorithm is,
in general, exponential in the maximal clique size, but that
this size being equal to 3 in our case, it becomes negligible
compared to the number of relatives and variants.
B. KINSHIP INFERENCE CRITERIA
Table 1 shows the inference criteria for different degrees
of kinship according Manichaikul et al. [36].
C. SUPPLEMENTARY FIGURES
In this appendix we provide extra figures to enable a bet-
ter understanding of the effect of the genotype completion on
the membership inference attack and of genotype data re-
leases beyond 1,000 variants on the kinship inference attack
for second-degree relatives.
Membership inference with or without genotype com-
pletion. We show in Figure 10(A) the effect that geno-
type completion has on the membership inference power for
the scenario described in the first use case of Section 8.2,
in which aggregate data of some variants of individuals in
the HIV-related cohort H have already been revealed and
queries request genotypes of the target individual. We ob-
serve that, after the vertical dotted line (which represents
equal number of aggregated statistics and genotypes avail-
able to the adversary), when genotype completion is not
Relationship φA,B Inference criteria
Monozygotic twin 1
2
> 1
23/2
Parent-offspring 1
4
[
1
25/2
, 1
23/2
]
Full siblings 1
4
[
1
25/2
, 1
23/2
]
2nd degree 1
8
[
1
27/2
, 1
25/2
]
3rd degree 1
16
[
1
29/2
, 1
27/2
]
Unrelated 0 < 1
29/2
Table 1: Kinship inference criteria based on the estimated
kinship coefficient φA,B .
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Figure 10: Power of membership inference for αm = 10−4:
interleaving genomic and aggregated queries
used (blue line), there is no difference with respect to the
case when genotype completion is used (green line). This is
because, regardless of the number of inferred genotypes, the
adversary does not have access to more aggregated statis-
tics. However, we observe (especially in the third row) that
before this line, the effect of genotype completion of the ad-
versary’s inference power is significant as he can use more
genotype values than those released by the queries.
Similarly, Figure 10(B) shows the effect of genotype com-
pletion for the scenario described in the third use case of
Section 8.2, in which the genotypes of some variants of the
target individual are already known and the system releases
aggregated statistics for the same variants. We see that in
this case, before the vertical dotted line, genotype comple-
tion has no impact on the inference power as the adversary
can only use the aggregate statistics that are revealed for
the attack. Yet, after the vertical dotted line, the adversary
can increase his inference power with every extra aggregate
statistic he observers thanks to genotype completion.
Kinship inference. Figure 11 complements Figure 5 by
showing the evolution of kinship inference power beyond the
release of 1,000 genotypes for the target individual A with
respect to a second-degree relative B. As mentioned above,
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Figure 11: Power of kinship inference for different degrees
and αd = 10−4 in the case of second degree relationship
between A and B.
only after about the genotypes of 4,000 variants are released,
the adversary can maximize her power of kinship inference
for d = 2.
D. NOTATION TABLE
For reference, Table 2 summarizes the notation we use
throughout this paper.
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Notation Description
aafi Alternate allele frequency at position i
y Disease susceptibility to be protected
Ψ(y) Set of variants associated with disease y
ωy = (ωy1 , . . . , ω
y
n) Set of effect-size coefficients for variants in Ψ(y)
φA,B Kinship coefficient for individual A and B
g = (g1, . . . , gn) Set of genotypes for a real genome
go,gu Set of observed, unobserved genotypes used by genotype inference
R Panel of reference individuals used by genotype inference
gˆ = (gˆ1, . . . , gˆn) Set of inferred genotypes
g˜ = (g˜1, . . . , g˜n) Set of genotypes for an avatar genome
g˙ = (g˙1, . . . , g˙n) Set of most common genotypes in the population
f = (f1, . . . , fn) Set of aggregated statistics for a real database
f˜ = (f˜1, . . . , f˜n) Set of aggregated statistics for an aggregated avatar
qg(gs) Query for the genotypes of a subset s of variants
qm(fs) Query for the aggregated statistics on a subset s of variants
Ag Genotypes revealed in previous queries
Am Aggregated statistics revealed in previous queries
Ry Risk of disclosing predisposition to disease y through phenotype inference attack
Rm Risk of disclosing database membership through membership inference attack
Rkd Risk of disclosing familial relationship of degree d through kinship inference attack
αm, βm Type I and II errors for database membership inference
αd, βd Type I and II errors for kinship inference of degree d
ρ Set of thresholds on inference risks
ρy Threshold on the risk of disclosing predisposition to disease y
ρm Threshold on the risk of disclosing membership m to the database
ρk Threshold on the risk of disclosing kinship
B Auxiliary information available to the adversary
Privg˜ Genome avatar’s privacy
Privf˜ Aggregated avatar’s privacy
Table 2: Notation used throughout the paper. For all variables, bold indicates a set.
19
